



# OpenTitan®

Past, Present & Future of Open Secure Silicon



Dominic Rizzo


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June 7th, 2023

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# The world's most active open-source silicon project

- @ RTL Freeze, chip-in-hand 2023, integrated upstream by EoY
- Transparent, flexible, high quality ecosystem – a resilient and growing coalition of partners
- This talk: the past, present and future of open secure silicon



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
# Past: Building an Open Silicon Coalition

# Key OpenTitan Milestones

- ~2018 Silicon Transparency Working Group chartered: lowRISC, Google & ETH Zürich
- Feb 2019 – First definition of **Comfortable IP**; first use of **standard, auto-gen'd documentation**
- Jun 2019 – **SystemVerilog style guide** defined
- Jun 2019 – OpenTitan **Technical Charter** defines Steering Committee, Technical Committee roles
- ~July 2019 OpenTitan chartered: Silicon, Security & Software Working Groups established
- Aug 2019 – **Continuous Integration** running on every pull request
- Oct 2019 – Structured **Hardware Development Milestones** defined
- Nov 2019 – Public launch of the OpenTitan repository
- ...
- Oct 2020 – Continuous Integration extended to include **running tests on FPGA**
- July 2022 - Integrated WG chartered
- July 2022 – regular **Silicon Commons training** for new starters established
- May 2023 – Silicon Commons delivers: open-source chip with 35+ IPs developed by 140 contributors from 10 partners enables 2023 Engineering Sample tapeout with RTL freeze
- Ongoing – 10 partner organizations actively contribution to discrete and integrated top-level development

# OpenTitan Discrete: the “Earl Grey” Top-Level

- RV32IMCB RISC-V “Ibex” core:
  - 3-stage pipeline, single-cycle multiplier
  - Selected subset of the bit-manipulation extension
  - 4kB instruction cache with 2 ways
  - RISC-V compliant JTAG DM (debug module)
  - PLIC (platform level interrupt controller)
  - U/M (user/machine) execution modes
  - Enhanced Physical Memory Protection (ePMP)
  - Security features:
    - Low-latency memory scrambling on the icache
    - Dual-core lockstep configuration
    - Data independent timing
    - Dummy instruction insertion
    - Bus and register file integrity
    - Hardened PC
- Memory:
  - 2x512kB banks eFlash
  - 128kB main SRAM
  - 4KB Always ON (AON) retention SRAM
  - 32kB ROM
  - 2kB OTP
- IO peripherals:
  - 47x multiplexable IO pads with pad control
  - 32x GPIO (using multiplexable IO)
  - 4x UART (using multiplexable IO)
  - 3x I2C with host and device modes (using multiplexable IO)
  - SPI device (using fixed IO) with TPM, generic, flash and passthrough modes
  - 2x SPI host (using both fixed and multiplexable IO)
- Security peripherals:
  - AES-128/192/256 with ECB/CBC/CFB/OFB/CTR modes
  - HMAC / SHA2-256
  - KMAC / SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512, [c]SHAKE-128, 256
  - Programmable big number accelerator for RSA and ECC (OTBN)
  - NIST-compliant cryptographically secure random number generator (CS RNG)
  - Digital wrapper for analog entropy source with FIPS and CC-compliant health checks
  - Key manager with DICE support
  - Manufacturing life cycle manager
  - Alert handler for handling critical security events
  - OTP controller with access controls and memory scrambling
  - Flash controller with access controls and memory scrambling
  - ROM and SRAM controllers with low-latency memory scrambling
- Other peripherals:
  - Clock, reset and power management
  - Fixed-frequency timer
  - Always ON (AON) timer
  - Pulse-width modulator (PWM)
  - Pattern Generator
- Software:
  - Boot ROM code implementing secure boot and chip configuration
  - Bare metal applications and validation tests




# Individual Contributors

## Monthly

- ~10 organizations
- 40+ contributors
- 100s of commits, issues, PRs
- 1000s of file changes
- 10,000s of individual edits

## 5+ Years (chartered 2018)

- 140+ unique contributors
- 13k merged PRs
  - 20k commits
- 1.5M LoC (0.5M HDL)



# Organizational Partners



## Steering Committee



## Contributors


Technical  
Committee

Committers

# Problem: Scalable Open Silicon Development




one skilled engineer



to develop a RISC-V core and open-source it




a team of engineers



to verify the core and bring it to commercial maturity



multiple teams of engineers



to design a chip around the core and deliver it to customers



multiple organizations with multiple teams



to develop and maintain the RTL, DV, firmware, & infrastructure for a complete open silicon ecosystem

**Need to get quality, collaboration and consensus right – from the start**





# Solution: The Silicon Commons

## Collateral

- [Extensive website](#)
- [Comportability](#)
- [Block documentation](#)
- [Top-level datasheet\(s\)](#)
- [Getting started guide\(s\)](#)
- Open silicon partner training sessions and material
- [How-to contribute](#) guides
- ...


## Technology

- Automated [code templating](#) and [documentation](#) generation
- [Continuous integration](#)
- [Nightly regressions](#)
- FPGA farm
- NewAE's [CW310](#), CW340 development platforms
- Hyperdebug & *opentitantool*
- ...

## Processes

- [Governance](#): SC, WGs, [IC](#), [Committers](#), PD
- [Hardware development stages](#)
- [RFC process](#)
- Yearly roadmap
- Tapeout Tech Leads
- On-call regression triage
- Certification-sensitive NDAs
- [Trademark policy](#)
- ...

# Silicon Commons: CI is a *massive* component





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# Present: Commercial Silicon

# Discrete Shuttle RTL Freeze

## Burndown: IP Blocks to M2.5


- >90% on nightlies + >90% coverage





# Tapeout and Engineering Sample Silicon

## OpenTitan Earlgrey ASIC

[Datasheet](#)



## Discrete Engineering Samples August '23



# OpenTitan as an Ecosystem Platform

## DANA: Universal Dataflow Analysis for Gate-Level Netlist Reverse Engineering

Nils Albert<sup>1,2</sup>, Max Hoffmann<sup>1,2</sup>, Sebastian Thummler<sup>1</sup>, Leonid Aschil<sup>3</sup>, and

## SYNFI: Pre-Silicon Fault Analysis of an Open-Source Secure Element

Pascal Nasahl  
Timothy

## To Be, or Not to Be Stateful: Post-Quantum Secure Boot using Hash-Based Signatures

Alexander Wagner<sup>\*</sup>  
Fraunhofer AISEC  
Garching, Germany

Felix Oberhansl<sup>\*</sup>  
Fraunhofer AISEC  
Garching, Germany

Marc Schink<sup>\*</sup>  
Fraunhofer AISEC  
Garching, Germany

**Abstract.** of Integra Examples Intellectual while mal Trojans. | with a lat This wor dataflow | of data be key idea. | control in without a that the | ranging fi of-the-art with supp demonstr whether t two appli already al also dema Hence, Di netlists at the other synthesiz **Keywords**

## AKER: A Design and Verification Framework for Safe and Secure SoC Access Control

Francesco Restuccia<sup>\*1</sup>, Andres Meza<sup>\*</sup>, and Ryan Kastner<sup>\*</sup>  
<sup>\*</sup>University of California San Diego <sup>†</sup>Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna Pisa

## Fuzzing Hardware Like Software

Timothy Trippel<sup>†</sup>, Kang G. Shin  
*Computer Science & Engineering*  
Am  
[trippel,kg

Alex Chernyakhovsky,  
Garret Kelly, Dominic Rizzo

Matthew Hicks  
*Computer Science*

## Kronos: Verifying leak-free reset for a system-on-chip with multiple clock domains

by  
Noah Moroze

Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science on January 15, 2021, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

## Abstract

Notary [3] uses formal verification to prove a hardware-level security property called deterministic start for a simple system-on-chip (SoC). Deterministic start requires that an SoC's state is fully reset by boot code to ensure that secrets cannot leak across reset boundaries. However, Notary's approach has several limitations. Its

**Abstract—**Modern architectures whar shared resources. | privilege levels far by an access contr for SoC access on (ACW) – a high that dynamically | access control syst wrapping control access control. | Dev and security. AKER MITRE common | control at the IP. | of the ACW model of the ACW when at the system level among shared res of access control | evaluated on a Xi with the OpenTitan access control syst

Modern Syste tures compris memory hierarch munication netw information here with tight constr [2].

In security-crit levels of trustw nature. Examples isolated from an accessible durin can access secur In order to ope control system | control policy det different periph life-cycle – desig OEMs, and on to e.g., policies diff and normal ope require an officit and secure ope a rigorous verifi process. Additi

The access o and secure ope a rigorous verifi process. Additi

## SCRAMBLE-CFI: Mitigating Fault-Induced Control-Flow Attacks on OpenTitan

Pascal Nasahl  
Graz Un  
pascal.n

Stefan Mangard

## Microsoft Security Response Center

Report an issue

## What's the smallest variety of CHERI?

Security Research & Defense / By Saar Amar / September 6, 2022

The Portmeiron project is a collaboration between Microsoft Research Cambridge, Microsoft Security Response Center, and Azure Silicon Engineering & Solutions. Over the past year, we have been exploring how to scale the key ideas from CHERI down to tiny cores on the scale of the cheapest microcontrollers. These cores are very different from the desktop and server-class processors that have been the focus of the Merlino project

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
# Future: A Design Ecosystem

# OpenTitan Project Roadmap

2022

2023



2024






# SPHINCS+ Verified Boot in ROM

- TC approved Jan 2023, implementation complete May 2023
- HSM integration for Eng Sample discrete silicon
- Full L1 security parameters; ~12ms verification
- E2E & SPX+ reference test suites
- Hardware accelerated, hardened implementation





# Commercial Tapeout: Nuvoton

- Experienced TPM vendor
- Responsible for turning a commercial-quality design into a commercially relevant chip: analog components, security sensors and countermeasures; abstracted through AST, secure manuf. and bring-up
- Aligned w/ certification requirements, inc. MSSR site
- Manages the tapeout process w/ the foundry
- Partners w/ OpenTitan partners like lowRISC, Google and zeroRISC on final integration and test




# What Is OpenTitan Integrated?



- 1st new formal Working Group since project start
- Adapting the [OpenTitan](#) IP ecosystem a larger SoC's secure subsystem
- *Not a single design*; SoC integration is highly variable: chiptlets, mobile, consumer, IoT, IIoT, etc.
- Certification alignment: FIP 140-3 and PP-0117

# Integrated OT RoT (Type A): “Darjeeling” Top-Level



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# Q & A

## Key Takeaways

- Discrete design is done
- Eng Sample silicon this year
- Integrated upstream this year
- Scalable development model
- Broadly adopted ecosystem of IP