### SafeLS: an Open Source Implementation of a Lockstep NOEL-V RISC-V Core



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
Link to the

Implementation

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
#### 1. Introduction




- Safety-critical automotive, avionics, and space systems require safety measures to prevent failures due to random hardware errors like radiation and electromagnetic interference.
- Common cause failures (CCFs) occur when a fault produces identical errors in redundant elements, making error detection with only redundancy impossible.
- Lockstep cores, where two cores execute the same instructions with a time offset, are commonly used to avoid CCFs in cores. Thanks to the time-diversity, faults will affect differently the two executions and enable the fault-detection at the output comparison.
- Commercial lockstep core solutions exist from chip vendors like Infineon and STMicroelectronics, but open-source implementations for safety-relevant SoCs are unavailable.
- THE CHALLENGE: Cover the gap by developing an open-source lockstep version of the RISC-V-based NOEL-V core by Frontgrade Gaisler.
- THE GOAL: The developed lockstep core is integrated into the open-source SELENE SoC, providing an open-source solution for safety-critical systems.

# 2. SafeLS: a Lockstep NOEL-V Core

- The sphere of replication refers to the level at which redundancy is implemented in a system.
- Pipeline stage level, as seen in recent implementations for RISC-V cores.
  - + Immediate error detection.
  - Intrusive and requires additional verification and validation.
- In safety-critical systems for automotive, space, avionics, and robotics, errors can often be managed at a coarser grain than pipeline stages.
- Immediate detection is not necessary as long as errors are detected when a safety-critical task completes its execution, preserving safety requirements.
- The chosen approach is to set the **sphere of replication** at the **core level**.





- All input signals for the NOEL-V core are replicated for both cores.
- One core receives the inputs immediately. The other core receives them with a programmable delay of 2 or 3 cycles.
- Outputs from one core are **delayed** by the same number of cycles.
- The Outcomes of both cores are compared before sending.
- If no discrepancy is detected, outcomes are delivered back to the rest of the system-on-chip.
- **Discrepancy** means that at least one of the outcomes is erroneous. If dual modular redundancy (DMR) is employed, it is unknown which outcome is correct.
- An appropriate interrupt is raised at the system level to manage the error (e.g., resetting the SafeLS and re-executing the task).

# **3. Future Plans**



• Release an open-source component for SELENE SoC as a standalone

• Safety-critical systems impose the use of lockstep cores to avoid CCFs.

module and part of the system (check the **QR**).

- Aim to enhance SELENE SoC with additional features for safety-critical systems in various domains (e.g., automotive, space, railway, robotics).
- First-level caches of the NOEL-V core are protected against single bit-flips.
- The read-only instruction cache is parity protected, and single bit-flips can be corrected by invalidating erroneous cache lines and fetching them from upper memory levels.
- Analyze a **smaller sphere of replication** that will exclude first-level caches in the cores to prevent cache duplication.
  - This approach may be more intrusive but offers advantages in terms of power and area.

- Our work delivered SafeLS, the first open-source RISC-V-based lockstep core based on the commercial Gaisler's NOEL-V and integrated into a fully-functional SoC (the SELENE SoC).
- The lockstep is validated, and the implementation will be released open-source by the time of the summit.

# 5. Acknowledgements

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