

Unique Program Execution Checking:

Formal Security Guarantees for RISC-V Systems


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
Motivation

- Discovery of **Meltdown** and **Spectre**
- Industry and academia found various vulnerabilities
- Need for **exhaustive security guarantees**



Confidentiality: Spectre Attack

- Attacker mistrains branch predictor to make the victim **access** confidential data **transiently**
- Secret data is encoded in the cache („**microarchitectural footprint**“) and extracted via a Flush and Reload attack
- Confidentiality is violated because the confidential data **interferes** with the execution of the attacker program



Unique Program Execution Checking (UPEC)

UPEC **exhaustively** detects all propagations of information from or to critical locations in a given RTL design:


- Possible leakage of **confidential** information
- Malicious interference with protected data (**integrity**)

UPEC proves that a system executes **uniquely** w.r.t. the signals of interest called **Source of Discrepancy (SoD)**

Advantages of UPEC

- ✓ **Exhaustive** detection of security vulnerabilities
- ✓ **Independent** of functional correctness of the DUV
- ✓ **Scalable** even for large designs (000 cores, whole SoCs)
- ✓ **Adaptable** to different threat models

Computational Model



DUV: Design under Verification

SoD: Source of Discrepancy

I: Inputs

O: Outputs

S: Microarchitectural State Variables

Generic UPEC Property

assume:

at t : $S_1 \setminus SoD == S_2 \setminus SoD$;

during $[t, t+k]$: $I_1 \setminus SoD == I_2 \setminus SoD$;

at t : $threat_model()$;

prove:

during $[t, t+k]$: $S_1 \setminus SoD == S_2 \setminus SoD$;


during $[t, t+k]$: $O_1 == O_2$;

UPEC-driven Design of Secure Systems

- Set up the miter (SoD, threat model-dependent constraints)
- Run the property check and inspect counterexamples
 - Harmless propagation → refine SoD
 - Propagation violating security → apply appropriate mitigation
- Repeat until no more counterexamples appear
- DUV is guaranteed to be secure w.r.t. the threat model

UPEC for Data-Independent Timing (DIT)

- UPEC-DIT detects **data-dependent timing** in accelerators and processors
 - Example **ibex**: features a **DIT mode** enabled by a corresponding CSR
 - UPEC-DIT revealed a **timing dependency, even in DIT mode**: misaligned addresses lead to an additional memory access






Number of memory accesses is different from an aligned access!

Paper:



Case Studies

| Security Target | DUV | Detected Vulnerabilities | Reference |
|---|-------------------|---|---|
| Transient-Execution-Attacks | <i>BOOM</i> | <i>Multiple Spectre variants, Meltdown</i> |  |
| Functional Security Bugs in SoCs | <i>Pulpissimo</i> | <i>Confused deputy attack using an accelerator ignoring PMP</i> |  |
| Operation Integrity in SoCs | <i>OpenTitan</i> | <i>Denial-of-Service attack using an untrusted IP</i> |  |

Summary

- UPEC is a **scalable** methodology for **exhaustively** detecting malicious information flows
- Case studies show the **versatility** of UPEC and its easy **adaptability** to different threat models
- UPEC enables to provide a **hardware root of trust** for higher levels of the system stack

Thank you for your attention!

Many thanks to many collaborators!

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Questions?

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