# SafeGantana: A Lockstep In-Order RISC-V Core

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#### Introduction

• Safety requirements can be found in a lot of domains

• **Safety-critical systems** need to meet specific requirements related to funcional safety and prove them in exchaustive verifcation and validation (V&V) processes

Detect faults

System components reach the highest integrity levels

- **SARGANTANA:** An open-source RISC-V core, which we aim at **making the basis** for our safety-relevant SoC.
- A 7-stage in-order 64-bit RISC-V core implementing the RV64G ISA.
- With Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) unit for acceleration purposes.

2.44 CoreMark/MHz

Prevent hazardous situations

(e.g., ASIL-D in automotive)

- Most used fault detection technique is **redundancy**
- Common Cause Failures (CCFs) occur when a fault produces identical errors in redundant elements.
- The generation of identical errors by the CCFs make the detection of error impossible with only redundancy.
- Safety mechanisms are required for <u>detecting Common Cause Failures.</u>
  - **Diverse redundancy** is mandatory
- Most common diverse redundancy scheme is to employ a Dual Core Lockstep (DCLS)
  - 2 identical cores executing the same code with some time staggering.

**THE CHALLENGE:** open-source RISC-V SoC relevant for safety-critical applications.

**THE SOLUTION:** DCLS version of the Sargantana core.

### SafeGantana: a DCLS Version of Sargantana



• The **Sphere of Replication** (SoR) is the region where comparison and coalescence occurs (the components replicated)

**TRADE-OFF** 

Small sphere of redundancy

- Lower replication costs
- Extra latency for all cache accesses
- **Shorter** Fault Detection Time Interval (FDTI)

**Big** sphere of redundancy

- Higher replication costs
- No penalty latency for cache hits
- **Bigger** Fault Detection Time Interval (FDTI)



### Future plans

- An extra functionality that has been implemented already: Fine-state machine for commanding the initial and finish phases in AXI transactions.
- Boot LINUX on SafeGantana (already booting on Sargantana)
- Integration in BSC Safety Soc (in-house safety platform)
  - $\rightarrow$  Report error as a platform interruption
  - $\Box$  Evaluate action upon the lockstep interruption
- Integration in OpenPiton platform and extend L2 and L3 with Error

• **Programmable delay** logic for staggering purposes, typically 2 or 3 cycles.

- **Delayed** inputs to the primary and **delayed** outputs from the secondary.
- **Error management:** mismatch between the outputs of the primary and secondary cores <u>detected by the comparator</u>. The core operation is stalled not allowing any further output to be propagated beyond the SoR.

#### Evaluation

- We have evaluated the behavior of the **SafeGantana with 3 cycles staggering**
- Validated the comparison logic with an error injector



- The error injector introduces an error at a specific time.
- We inject the error in an output signal targeting the I-Cache from the **primary** core.
- After delaying the signal, the comparison logic detects the error against the error-free output from the **secondary** core.



Correction Codes (ECC)

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		Secondary Error signal		80001C80		
				Frr	or injection	Error detection
Hardware cos	sts	Number of LUTs	% of to	LUTs respect single core	Number of registers	% of registers respect to single core
	Single Core	1/6/00		100%	76 190	1000/
		140.400		10076	70.169	100%
	Double Core	292.800		200%	152.378	200%



