

The Performance and (Hidden) Communication Cost of Hardware Accelerators for Hash Primitives Used in Post-Quantum-Cryptography

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Motivation


- Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) uses computationally intensive subroutines
 - Huge percentage for hashing and PRNG (mostly SHA-3)
 - Other examples NTT-based polynomial multiplication (mostly for lattice schemes)
- HW acceleration obviously makes sense
✗ BUT accelerators often under-utilized!

Contribution

- Benchmarks of architectures for **Hash** (variable input, fixed output length) and **CSPRNG** scenario (fixed input, variable output length)
- Case-Study of **SPHINCS+**, **Kyber**, **Dilithium** and **Falcon**

Benchmark Results - SHAKE256


Hash Scenario



(a) Hash scenario up to 256 Bytes input (b) Hash scenario up to 4096 Bytes input

- Tightly-coupled efficient for small inputs, suffers from “software absorption”
- LSU-coupled version efficient due to parallel absorption/data transfer

CSPRNG Scenario



(a) CSPRNG scenario up to 256 Bytes output (b) CSPRNG scenario up to 4096 Bytes output

- LSU-coupled version still efficient in general

Hardware Acceleration^a





Figure 1 Overview of the platform and the different coupling options



(a) Tightly Coupled Architecture (b) Loosely (SRAM) Coupled Architecture (c) Loosely (FIFO) Coupled Architecture (d) LSU (FIFO) Coupled Architecture


Case-Study: SPHINCS+

Architecture	Keygen	Sign	Verify	Architecture	Keygen	Sign	Verify
shake256_sw	145 119 3 602 835	201 209		shake256_sw	9 288 740	70 607 335	69 400
shake256_lsu	1 725	42 598	2 458	shake256_lsu	109 770	837 742	852
shake256_tightly	2 902	71 921	4 091	shake256_tightly	184 914	1 410 992	1 419

Table 1 Kilo cycles for SPHINCS+ 128f-simple.

Table 2 Kilo cycles for SPHINCS+ 128s-simple.

Case-Study: Kyber



- Round-reduction directly visible in SW
- ✓ About 25% to 30% speed-up for turbo-shake256
- Limited gain for accelerators
- Less than 1% for turbo-shake256

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^aPatrick Karl, Jonas Schupp, and Georg Sigl. “The Impact of Hash Primitives and Communication Overhead for Hardware-Accelerated SPHINCS+”. In: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. Ed. by Romain Wacquez and Naofumi Homma. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024, pp. 221–239.