


# Formal Verification of Security-Properties on RISC-V Processors

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
## Motivation

- High security demands of upcoming applications, e.g. autonomous driving
- In past years several famous bugs and security-vulnerabilities in processors found
- Design flaws can be exploited by attackers



**Formal verification of security-critical functionality required**


- RISC-V security verification guidance needed
- **Our work increases RISC-V security by:**
  - 1. Comprehensive identification of security-critical functionality**
  - 2. Derivation of properties for security-critical functionality correctness**
  - 3. Formal verification of the properties**



**Collaboration with TUM Chair of Security in Information Technology**

## Methodology

- Akaria NS31A commercial RISC-V processor verified
  - 32-bit, 4 pipeline stages, 3 privilege modes
- Verification using Cadence Jasper Formal Verification Platform



## Work presents comprehensive set of security-properties for RISC-V security hardening

### Security-Properties

- Identified security-critical functionality:

Instruction Execution	CSRs	Debug Operation
Check instruction flow through pipeline	Comply with CSR access rules	Comply with Debug CSR access rules
Exception and Interrupt	Mode Transition	PMP
Proper handling required	Mode transition rules need to be met	Access control rules for memory regions need to be met
Control Flow	Register Update	Memory Access
Correct setting of program counter	Correct target register is updated	Value and address of memory transfers as intended

- Example mode transition SVA properties:

When exception happens, privilege mode is set to machine mode:

```
assert property (@(posedge clk) disable iff (rst)
    exception_happen |-> ##1 PrivMode==MachineMode);
```

When return from debug/machine mode, MRET update privilege mode with the previous mode saved:

```
assert property (@(posedge clk) disable iff (rst)
    mret_occured |-> ##1 PrivMode==$past(MstatusMPP));
```

SVA : System Verilog Assertions, CSR : Control and Status Register, PMP: Physical Memory Protection

### Results

- Used Jasper settings:
  - Jasper contains formal verification engines for full-proofs and bug-hunting
    - engines use different model checking techniques, e.g. BDD or SAT-based
  - verified all properties of a category in parallel
  - use of several Jasper engines in parallel
  - automatic choosing of most suitable engine
- We identified 1146 properties and grouped them under 9 categories
- Achieved full-proof for passing properties
- Runtime: Control Flow < 24h, others < 4000s

Categories	Properties		
	Assertion	Pass	Fail
Instruction Execution	10	10	0
CSR	394	280	114
Debug Operation	14	14	0
Exception and Interrupt	87	87	0
Mode Transition	13	13	0
PMP	574	574	0
Control Flow	9	8	1
Register Update	33	33	0
Memory Access	12	12	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1146</b>	<b>1031</b>	<b>115</b>

3 bugs found