Ahead of Time Generation for **GPSA** Protection in RISC-V Embedded Cores

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



Context Embedded Systems

- Energy constrained
- Everywhere, for every usage
- Remote, mobile
 - allows invasive attacks











Context Fault Injection Attacks (FIA)

- Alter transistors state by external means
 - laser, clock, power, EM
- Can propagate and cause errors:
 - Data corruption
 - Control flow errors
 - Instruction skip/repeat
 - Branch faulting






Context

Countermeasures against Fault Injection

- Techniques for fault detection
 - redundancy, signatures

- Multiple implementations
 - modifying program
 - modifying architecture



GPSA and CSM

Global Path Signature Analysis & Continuous Signature Monitoring


- Verifying the Control Flow
- Signature processing
- At compile time

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
- Each instruction has a signature
- f fu • col Requirements (usually)
- Dynai
 (micro)architecture
 - dynamic signature computation and comparison
 - compiler
 - reference signature and patch generation




SCI-FI

Countermeasure

- GPSA and CSM implementation
- microarchitecture modification to a pipeline
 - **CSI**: ensures pipeline execution integrity
 - **CCFI**: dynamic signature processing



- compiler modification:
 - store in the .data section
 - additional instructions



SCI-FI Countermeasure


- Only considering faults in the processor logic
- GPSA and CSM implementation
 - that ensures Control Flow, Code and Control Signal Integrities
- Limits:
 - requires compiling the application
 - indirect jumps (unknown in CFG)
 - But we want to run any program, without having to recompile it

 GPSA values

 CFI component

Runtime GPSA generation Another solution

- Rely on runtime environment for GPSA generation
 - Indirect jumps
 - Context switches




Runtime GPSA generation

Execution Scheme

Dynamic GPSA and CSM generation


- 1. Branch execution
 - signature must exist
 - if patch doesn't exist: interrupt
- 2. GPSA interrupt execution
 - reference for nxtbr
 - patch for *src*
- 3. Resume execution until next node



Runtime GPSA generation

Hardware/Software runtime

- Avoiding patches and references additional load instructions
- Adding a dedicated memory
 - 2-values read port for CCFI
 - reserved instructions
- and some operators ...




Runtime GPSA generation Another solution

- Rely on runtime environment for GPSA generation
 - Indirect jumps
 - Context switches
 - High performance overhead
 - No Code Integrity
 - No reuse from previous executions

Hardware/Software runtime

- Replacing the compiler with
 - a static analysis for GPSA generation
 - and a runtime environment to handle dynamic events
 - Indirect jumps
 - Context switches
 - Code integrity

Ahead-of-Time analysis




Upon installation

a) binary code sample


b) CFG and list of basic blocks

c) sorted list of GPSA values

Ahead-of-Time analysis




Ahead-of-Time analysis




Ahead-of-Time analysis

Branch not taken: Offset not used, pointer to next line




Ahead-of-Time analysis


Branch taken: Offset used, pointer plus two lines



Ahead-of-Time analysis




JALR protection



Experimental Study Results

implemented on Comet



• performance overhead :

≈ **x**3,4 (SCI-FI: **x**1,25) (TMR-SW: ≥ **x**3)

area overhead :

- $\approx \times 2$ (SCI-FI: $\times 1,23$) (TMR-HW: $\times 3$)
- But we handle indirect jumps

Conclusion & Future Works

GPSA Solution for unmodified binary

- Routine Algorithm variations to tackle edge cases
 - Taking some advance building the CFG
 - Simplifying CFG with Fallthrough instead of JAL
- Study the protection of different lengths of signatures
 - 16-bit signatures and patches could reduce area overhead