

# CAPSTONE: An Architecture Design for Expressive Security



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## Motivation: Patchwork of Security Extensions

### Security Challenges



Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1. Debian Linux	Debian	OS	8361
2. Android	Google	OS	5136
3. Endora	Endora/Secot	OS	4492
4. Ubuntu Linux	Canonical	OS	3951
5. Linux Kernel	Linux	OS	3185
6. Mac OS X	Apple	OS	3103
7. Windows 10	Microsoft	OS	3054
8. Windows Server 2016	Microsoft	OS	3042
9. Ubuntu 14.04	Ubuntu	OS	2941
10. Chrome	Google	Application	2872

Memory Safety

Fine-grained Isolation

Confidential Computing

### Patchwork of Security Extensions

Spatial Memory Safety	[Intel <u>MPK</u> , x86/64 <u>DEP/NX</u> ][Intel <u>MPX</u> , RISC-V/ARM <u>CHERI</u> ]
Temporal Memory Safety	[ARM <u>MTE</u> ]
Concurrent Thread Safety	[Intel <u>TSX</u> ] [ARM <u>TME</u> ]
Intra-process Sandboxing	[Intel <u>SGX</u> ] [Intel <u>MPK</u> ]
Process Sandboxing	[x86/64 <u>Privilege Rings</u> ]
Virtualization	[AMD <u>SEV</u> ] [Intel <u>VT-x</u> ] [Intel <u>TDX</u> ] [ARM <u>CCA</u> ]
Red-Green Secure Worlds	[ARM <u>TZ</u> ] [Intel <u>TXT</u> ]
Nested / App Virtualization	[Intel <u>VT-x</u> ] [Intel <u>SGX</u> ]

### Problem: Compose Security Extensions?

Example: SGX

+ Exception handling  
(Cui et al., 2021)




Arbitrary code execution

Affecting 9 SGX runtimes

CVE-2021-0186, CVE-2021-33767

+ Memory sharing  
(Yu et al., 2022)



2–3 orders of magnitude overhead

## Goal

Can one design a unified foundation for multiple security goals? (Yu et al., 2023)

Minimal set of properties

P1: Exclusive Access

P2: Revocable Delegation

P3: Extensible Hierarchy

P4: Secure Domain Switching


CAPSTONE

Capstone (USENIX '23)


- Spatial Memory Safety
- Temporal Memory Safety
- Concurrent Thread Safety
- Intra-process Sandboxing
- Process Sandboxing
- Virtualization
- Red-Green Secure Worlds
- Nested / App Virtualization

## Desired Properties


### P1: Exclusive Access




### P2: Revocable Delegation



### P3: Extensible Hierarchy




### P4: Secure Domain Switching




## Base Design: Capability-based Security


### Capability



### Unforgeability




### Monotonicity



### Base Capability-based Model Is Insufficient


Example: P1 (Exclusive Access) cannot be achieved




## Capability-based Model in CAPSTONE

- Linear capability: Non-duplicable
- Revocation capability: A capability “snapshot”, usable only for revocation

Example:




Other capability types:




## Example Use Cases


### Nestable Two-way Isolation



### Safety of Mixed Rust Code



## CAPSTONE Stack



For more information,  
scan the QR codes →



CAPSTONE



Documentation



Author