

RISC-V SUMMIT 2025

RISC-V open designs and contributions to hardware security research and development activities

**Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
(ANSSI)**



Technical challenges


Secure
Hardware
Foundation



Implement hardware-based security functions

- Performances optimization, SWaP and security balancing (mobility, sustainability)
- Early stages, protection of the cores, techno specific properties

Secure by design



Improve the level of assurance

- Improvement of tools for security proof verification
- Control the design and the configuration of the security functions

Tightly coupling of
hardware and
software security



Securing the software

- Mechanisms securing the software implementation
- Support the increase in the size and complexity of systems



Security features

Design specific

Core

Secure boot
Memory protection
Control flow integrity
Pipeline protection
PMP/MMU
Crypto acc.

Buses & interconnect


Firewall
Access control
Secure partitioning

Peripherals

IOPMP/MMU
Worldguard/TEE
Crypto coproc.

Techno specific

TRNG / Performances / Hardware attacks





Some current activities or topics of interest

... but there are many other project to which ANSSI does not contribute directly

❑ Survey and technical analysis

- Core security functions : CVA6, CV32E40S, Ibex (Secure and CherIoT), Caliptra
- Secure SoC design : OpenTitan, Caliptra
- Tools : μ ArchiFI

❑ Collaborations

- Hardware accelerator with the IP ECC
- Hardware resources sharing for crypto-agility in PQC



❑ Contributions to funded projects

- ARSENE Project - funded under PEPR Cyber - 2022 / 2027
- FORWARD project - funded under PTCC – 2025 / 2029





Hardware acceleration for Elliptic Curves Crypto (ECC)

... for side channel & physical-attacks countermeasures analysis and testing


- ❑ Use case models: hardware root of trust (e.g secure enclave) or authentication
- ❑ IP Features:
 - Embedded TRNG
 - Two static exclusive modes :
 - ✓ unsecure
 - 🔒 In this mode, every synthesized countermeasure (CM) can be engaged or disengaged
 - ✓ secure
 - 🔒 In this mode, no synthesized countermeasure can be disengaged
 - SCA countermeasures : «defense-in-depth» rationale:
 - ✓ Built-in CMs : Constant time, Initial coordinates randomization, Anti-address bit DPA (including anti-collisions), Check that input and output points belong to the curve
 - ✓ Optional CMs : Blinding, Sensitive points address shuffling, Large Numbers memory address shuffling, Periodic coordinates randomization
- ❑ IP Design: 100% technology agnostic (except for TRNG) both for FPGA & ASIC




Hardware acceleration for Elliptic Curves Crypto (ECC)

From FPGA designs to full ASIC implementation


- ❑ Can be used with libecc* project running on ARM / RISC-V processor



1st Step :
SoC / FPGA



2nd Step :
Full FPGA



3rd Step :
Full ASIC
ongoing

In collaboration
with the CEA



* Library for elliptic curves cryptography





Hardware sharing for ML-KEM and HQC

Switching between different PQC cryptosystems... based on a same hardware



Our targeted agility + Hardware : ML-KEM (lattice-based) + HQC (code-based)

- Identification and share common operations in a single implementation



PHOENIX design based on Super-Butterfly


Inria

In collaboration with
the CEA & INRIA



Application-specific accelerators integration strategy

- Tightly-coupling (1) : Few flexibility but low latency
- Loosely-coupling (2) : More flexible but higher latency





ANSSI is part of the consortium

❑ Part of the Priority Research Programs and Equipment – France 2030

- Program overseen by the CEA, CNRS, and Inria, divided in ten challenges (among which ARSENE)
- Partners: CEA, CNRS, Inria, IMT, Grenoble INP, ENSTA Bretagne, ANSSI, and several universities (Grenoble Alpes, Saint-Etienne, Montpellier, Bretagne Sud, Bretagne Occidentale, Rennes 1)

❑ Challenge: hardware and software security of embedded systems

- Securing the reference implementations of two ranges of RISC-V processors:
 - ✓ 32-bit RISC-V, for constrained IoT applications, intrinsically secure against physical attacks
 - ✓ 64-bit RISC-V for richer applications, particularly secure against software attacks exploiting hardware vulnerabilities
- Secure integration of these processors within systems-on-chip (SoCs)
 - ✓ research and development of critical building blocks (random number generators, secure memories, agile cryptographic accelerators for so-called "pre- and post-quantum" algorithms, etc.)
- Study of software tools for secure codes, secure kernels, dynamic supervision techniques
- Demonstration and validation on FPGA and ASIC type components



ARSENE project: ANSSI's perspectives

❑ Contributions

- Security analysis of 32-bit RISC-V based secure elements (SCA and FI)
- Securing 64-bit RISC-V based applicative SoC (micro-architectural attacks, lifecycle, boot management)
- Work on the RISC-V ISA to improve performance and security of cryptographic algorithms

❑ Interests

- Availability of open-hardware secure elements, protected against high level attackers,...
- A step towards applicative processors with security features, suitable for mobile secure applications
- Contribution to the test chip produced during the project and practical analysis of it



ANSSI is part of the consortium

❑ Part of the Cyber Campus Transfert Program – France 2030

- Relies on the dynamics of the Cyber Campus and its network to promote joint projects between academic, industrial and government players
- Partners: CEA, Inria, Sorbonne university, Mines Saint-Etienne, ANSSI, Thales DIS, Safran

❑ Challenge: formal verification and physical attacks resilience of HW countermeasures

- Formal analysis applied to countermeasures verification
- Designing countermeasures and characterizing their robustness
 - ✓ Sophisticated attacker models
 - ✓ Multiple faults
- Quantifying the gap between experimental characterizations and formal verification
 - ✓ Experimentation platforms : Fault injection platforms (laser or EM)
 - ✓ Formal verification platforms : e.g. μ ArchFI, SAMVA (software centric)



❑ Interests

- Interest in applying formal verification methods to the hardware domain
 - ✓ Better threat coverage
- Dissemination of open-source tools to industry
- Having a proven methodology to validate the security benefits of hardware countermeasures
 - ✓ Being able to use characterization results during the design step
 - ✓ Being able to compare several countermeasure proposals available in the state of the art
- Need for formal methods that are as close as possible to experimental analysis results
 - ✓ Interesting to measure the gap between the two approaches



References

- ❑ **IPECC project** : <https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/IPECC>
 - Libecc projet : <https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/libecc>
- ❑ **PHOENIX paper (eprint)** : <https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/601.pdf>
- ❑ **ARSENE project (for French readers...)** :
 - Project overview : <https://www.pepr-cybersecurite.fr/projet/arsene/>
 - Some details : <https://www.pepr-cyber-arsene.fr/details/>
- ❑ **FORWARD project (for French readers too...)** :
 - Project summary : <https://ptcc.fr/projets/forward/>
- ❑ **μArchiFI project** : <https://github.com/CEA-LIST/uArchiFI>
- ❑ **SAMVA paper (JAIF 2023)** : <https://jaif.io/2023/media/JAIF2023-slides-Gicquel.pdf>

Thank you for your attention

Any questions ?

